



Indonesia's National Security Strategy in Managing the Implications of the Israel-Palestine Conflict

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ABSTRACT

The Israel-Palestine conflict remains one of the most persistent international disputes and continues to generate geopolitical, economic, and ideological repercussions beyond the Middle East. For Indonesia, these repercussions are not military in nature but emerge through economic exposure, public opinion mobilisation, and transnational extremist narratives. This study aims to analyse how Indonesia's national security strategy can effectively manage the indirect implications of the Israel-Palestine conflict by integrating diplomatic, economic, and socio-political instruments. The research employs a qualitative analytical approach based on security studies theory, particularly securitisation and comprehensive national security frameworks, supported by secondary data from academic journals and policy literature. The findings reveal that Indonesia possesses strategic strengths in moral diplomacy, total defence doctrine, and counter-radicalisation experience, which can be mobilised to mitigate ideological contagion, economic shocks, and social polarisation linked to the conflict.

INTRODUCTION

National security fundamentally concerns the preservation of a state's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political stability against a wide spectrum of threats, ranging from military aggression and terrorism to economic vulnerability and social fragmentation. Contemporary security studies emphasise that national security is no longer confined to military defence but also encompasses political, economic, societal, and environmental dimensions (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998; Baldwin, 1997). Indonesia's national security doctrine reflects this comprehensive approach by integrating military capability with socio-economic resilience, diplomatic engagement, and civil preparedness under the concept of total defence. Indonesia's geopolitical outlook traditionally emphasises strategic autonomy, regional stability within ASEAN, and active participation in global peace initiatives, consistent with its long-standing principle of *bebas aktif* foreign policy (Leifer, 1983; Sukma, 2011). Within this framework, threats to national security are no longer limited to direct military confrontation but also encompass indirect and transnational effects of conflicts occurring beyond national borders.

Conflicts occurring outside Indonesia's immediate geographic environment can nevertheless exert significant influence on its security landscape when they generate global geopolitical repercussions, economic disruptions, or ideological spillovers. Among such conflicts, the Israel–Palestine conflict stands out as one of the most protracted and internationally significant disputes in modern history. Persisting for more than seven decades, this conflict is rooted in competing territorial claims, identity politics, and nationalist aspirations, and has repeatedly escalated into cycles of armed confrontation that produce extensive civilian casualties and humanitarian crises. Scholarly analyses indicate that this conflict does not merely affect local or regional dynamics but produces systemic consequences at the international level, influencing security alignments, diplomatic behaviour, and regional stability (Kelman, 2007; Gleditsch et al., 2002). The persistence of the conflict has also been identified as a destabilising factor within the broader Middle East security complex, with implications that extend beyond the region itself (Buzan & Wæver, 2003).

Geopolitical instability in the Middle East, particularly during periods of military escalation, is strongly associated with global economic volatility. Armed conflict disrupts energy markets through fluctuations in crude oil prices, threatens strategic trade routes, and heightens investor perceptions of risk. Empirical studies demonstrate that geopolitical conflicts significantly increase oil price volatility and transmit economic shocks to importing countries (Caldara & Iacoviello, 2022; Hamilton, 2009). These disturbances shape national economies worldwide, including Indonesia, through their effects on inflation, exchange rates, and fiscal balances. Quantitative analyses further confirm that increases in global oil prices exert statistically significant upward pressure on inflation in developing economies, particularly those with fuel subsidy regimes (Rafiq, Salim, & Bloch, 2009; Apergis & Miller, 2009). This causal relationship may be conceptually illustrated through a diagram showing how geopolitical conflict leads to oil price volatility, which in turn generates inflation, economic stress, and

potentially social unrest. Likewise, a comparative line graph juxtaposing crude oil price fluctuations during major Middle Eastern escalations with Indonesia's consumer price index would visually demonstrate the transmission of external conflict into domestic economic vulnerability.

Although Indonesia has no direct military involvement in the Israel-Palestine conflict, several dynamics justify the need for a national security strategy capable of anticipating and mitigating its indirect impacts. Diplomatically, Indonesia has consistently supported Palestinian statehood and peace negotiations through multilateral forums, particularly the United Nations. This stance reflects Indonesia's identity as the world's largest Muslim-majority democracy and its normative commitment to international law and humanitarian principles. Studies of Indonesian foreign policy demonstrate that support for Palestine functions both as moral positioning and as a tool of diplomatic legitimacy within the Islamic world and the Global South (Sukma, 2011; Anwar, 2010). At the same time, such diplomatic positioning situates Indonesia within broader global geopolitical contestations, requiring careful strategic calculation to balance ethical commitments, international credibility, and national interests (Solihin et al., 2023).

Beyond diplomacy, global narratives surrounding the conflict exert influence over domestic political discourse in Indonesia. Public opinion regarding the Israel-Palestine issue frequently manifests in political mobilisation, mass demonstrations, and symbolic solidarity movements. Research on transnational political mobilisation suggests that distant conflicts can be internalised by domestic audiences and transformed into identity-based political action (Adamson, 2005; Kaldor, 2013). While such expressions generally remain peaceful, they carry latent risks of social polarisation and internal tension if not effectively managed by state institutions. In this sense, the psychological and symbolic dimensions of the conflict may translate into domestic stability challenges, underscoring the importance of political communication strategies and social cohesion policies as components of national security.

Furthermore, conflict in the Middle East may provide ideological material for transnational extremist networks, which utilise narratives of injustice and victimhood to support recruitment and mobilisation. Studies on terrorism and radicalisation show that global conflicts are frequently incorporated into extremist propaganda frames to legitimise violence and enhance group cohesion (Hegghammer, 2010; Ingram, 2016). Although empirical evidence of direct operational links between the Israel-Palestine conflict and terrorist activity in Indonesia remains limited, strategic analyses emphasise the phenomenon of narrative contagion, whereby distant conflicts become embedded within local extremist discourses (Snow, Oseland, & Corrigan-Brown, 2007). This highlights the relevance of counter-terrorism strategies, digital surveillance, and deradicalisation programmes within a holistic national security framework.

Economic resilience constitutes another core pillar of national security. Indonesia's structural dependence on international commodity markets renders it sensitive to geopolitical shocks originating in conflict-prone regions. Escalations in the Middle East that elevate energy prices can increase state subsidy burdens and reduce household purchasing power, thereby affecting social stability and political legitimacy. Empirical macroeconomic research confirms that oil price shocks significantly affect government spending, inflation, and growth in emerging economies (Arezki & Blanchard, 2014; Rafiq et al., 2009). In analytical terms, this dynamic may be represented through a figure mapping oil price increases against inflation and public expenditure pressures, illustrating how external conflict transforms into internal vulnerability.

Despite the extensive global literature addressing the Israel–Palestine conflict and its humanitarian, political, and diplomatic dimensions, relatively limited scholarly attention has been devoted to analysing how Indonesia's national security apparatus should strategically adapt to its indirect consequences. Existing studies predominantly emphasise Indonesia's diplomatic role and normative commitment to Palestinian independence, while issues of internal security preparedness, economic resilience, and strategic risk management remain underexplored. Research on Indonesian defence management confirms that defence diplomacy has been a central policy instrument in responding to the conflict, yet it also reveals insufficient emphasis on comprehensive national security contingencies and integrated risk assessment (Asakir & Almubaroq, 2025).

In sum, although geographically distant, the Israel–Palestine conflict exerts multidimensional implications for Indonesia's national security, encompassing economic vulnerability, societal cohesion, ideological exposure, and diplomatic positioning. These indirect but persistent impacts demonstrate the strategic necessity for Indonesia to formulate a nuanced national security strategy that integrates defence, diplomacy, economic resilience, and social stability. In an increasingly interconnected global system, national security can no longer be defined solely by territorial defence but must account for how distant conflicts reshape domestic risk environments, making strategic anticipation and adaptive policy design essential for safeguarding national stability (Buzan et al., 1998; Baldwin, 1997).

LITERATURE REVIEW

Previous studies have examined the broader implications of protracted conflicts for international and national security, particularly in relation to geopolitical spillovers. Gleditsch et al. (2002) analysed global patterns of armed conflict and demonstrated that long-standing regional conflicts tend to generate transnational effects, including political instability and security externalities beyond the conflict zone. Their findings indicate that conflicts such as the Israel–Palestine dispute do not remain confined to their geographical origins but influence international security alignments and risk perceptions. This study is relevant to the present research because it provides empirical evidence that distant conflicts can affect the security environment of states not directly

involved, thereby justifying the need for Indonesia to incorporate external conflict dynamics into its national security strategy (Gleditsch et al., 2002).

Research on geopolitical conflict and economic security further highlights how external wars influence domestic stability. Caldara and Iacoviello (2022) developed a Geopolitical Risk Index and demonstrated that increases in geopolitical tensions significantly raise uncertainty in global markets, leading to fluctuations in energy prices and investment patterns. Their quantitative analysis shows that geopolitical shocks have measurable macroeconomic consequences, particularly for energy-importing and developing countries. This study supports the argument that escalation in the Middle East, including the Israel–Palestine conflict, may indirectly affect Indonesia’s economic security through oil price volatility and inflationary pressure, which in turn can undermine social and political stability (Caldara & Iacoviello, 2022).

In the Indonesian context, Solihin et al. (2023) examined Indonesia’s role in the Israel–Palestine conflict through the framework of multi-track diplomacy. Their study found that Indonesia’s engagement has primarily focused on diplomatic advocacy and humanitarian support rather than on strategic national security preparedness. While the research demonstrates Indonesia’s normative commitment to Palestinian independence and international law, it also reveals a policy orientation that prioritises external diplomacy over internal security risk management. This gap is significant because it suggests that Indonesia’s response to the conflict has not yet been fully integrated into a comprehensive national security strategy addressing economic vulnerability, social cohesion, and ideological risks (Solihin et al., 2023).

Barry Buzan’s Security Theory (Sectoral Security)

Barry Buzan conceptualises security not merely as a military issue but as a multidimensional phenomenon encompassing five principal sectors: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. A state’s security is assessed by its ability to protect its core values in each of these sectors from both internal and external threats (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998). In the context of the Israel–Palestine conflict, its impact on Indonesia does not manifest as a direct military threat but rather through the political sector (diplomatic pressure and foreign policy positioning), the societal sector (religious solidarity and the potential for radicalisation), and the economic sector (disruptions to global trade and energy supply chains). Through Buzan’s sectoral approach, regional conflicts in the Middle East can be analysed as indirect threats to Indonesia’s national stability via geopolitical and psychosocial spillover effects that transcend territorial boundaries (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). Consequently, Indonesia’s national security strategy must be formulated not only in terms of territorial defence but also in relation to the management of domestic political and social stability in response to global conflicts.

Securitisation Theory (The Process of Securitisation)

Securitisation theory, developed by the Copenhagen School, explains that an issue becomes a “security threat” not solely because of its objective characteristics but because it is constructed as such through a speech act by authoritative actors, such as governments or political elites (Wæver, 1995). When an issue is successfully securitised, the state gains legitimacy to adopt extraordinary measures beyond normal political procedures (Buzan et al., 1998). In the Indonesian context, the Israel–Palestine conflict may be securitised when it is perceived as a threat to public order, national unity, or political stability due to heightened ideological and religious sentiment. This securitisation process is reflected in state policies concerning the regulation of public demonstrations, counter-radicalisation programmes, and active diplomacy in international forums. Thus, securitisation theory helps to explain how an external conflict can be transformed into a domestic security issue through political discourse and policy responses (Stritzel, 2007).

The Concept of National Security

The classical concept of national security focuses on protecting the state from external military threats; however, contemporary perspectives broaden this definition to include political stability, social cohesion, and economic sustainability (Walt, 1991). National security is understood as a condition in which the state is able to safeguard its survival, sovereignty, and the welfare of its population from a wide spectrum of threats, both conventional and non-conventional (Hough et al., 2015). Within this framework, the Israel–Palestine conflict constitutes an indirect threat to Indonesia insofar as it may provoke social unrest, increase the risk of extremism, and affect Indonesia’s strategic position in global and Islamic world politics. Accordingly, Indonesia’s national security strategy must integrate defence, diplomacy, and internal security as a unified policy framework. This approach corresponds with the notion of comprehensive security, which regards the state not merely as a military actor but also as a manager of national stability within an increasingly interconnected international system (Acharya, 2001).

METHODOLOGY

The research employs a qualitative analytical approach based on security studies theory, particularly securitisation and comprehensive national security frameworks, supported by secondary data from academic journals and policy literature.

RESEARCH RESULT AND DISCUSSIONS

Historical Background of the Israel–Palestine Conflict

The Israel–Palestine conflict is one of the most enduring and complex disputes in modern international politics, rooted in competing territorial claims, nationalist aspirations, and religious identity. Its origins are commonly traced to the late Ottoman period and intensified under the British Mandate for Palestine, culminating in the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. This event led to large-scale displacement of Palestinians, known as the Nakba, and initiated a prolonged cycle of wars, uprisings, and failed peace negotiations (Khalidi, 2020). Subsequent conflicts, including the 1967 Six-Day War and the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, entrenched the territorial and political dimensions of the dispute, transforming it into a central issue in Middle Eastern geopolitics (Gordon, 2012).

The conflict has evolved beyond a conventional interstate struggle into an asymmetrical confrontation between Israel and Palestinian political entities, particularly Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. Periodic escalations, such as those in Gaza, have produced severe humanitarian consequences, including civilian casualties, infrastructure destruction, and long-term socio-economic deprivation (Farsakh, 2019). International mediation efforts, most notably the Oslo Accords, failed to achieve a sustainable settlement, while continued settlement expansion and security measures deepened mutual distrust (Caplan, 2019). As a result, the conflict persists as both a territorial dispute and a symbolic struggle over self-determination and justice.

Beyond its regional context, the Israel–Palestine conflict carries global political significance. It has consistently shaped international diplomacy, polarised global public opinion, and influenced alignments among major powers. Scholars argue that the conflict operates as a “global narrative conflict”, in which competing interpretations of victimhood, legality, and resistance are projected onto international audiences (Mälksoo, 2015). These narratives contribute to international polarisation and can generate ideological resonance far beyond the Middle East.

For Indonesia, the implications of the Israel–Palestine conflict are primarily indirect but strategically relevant. Diplomatically, Indonesia has maintained a firm position in support of Palestinian statehood and international law, consistent with its constitutional commitment to oppose colonialism and promote global justice. This stance enhances Indonesia’s moral legitimacy within the Muslim world and among developing countries but also places it within a highly polarised international issue requiring careful diplomatic management (Anwar, 2010).

Societally, the conflict holds strong symbolic meaning for Indonesian Muslims, frequently triggering public mobilisation and solidarity movements. While these expressions are largely peaceful, studies on political communication suggest that distant conflicts can influence domestic political discourse and identity politics, potentially increasing social polarisation if instrumentalised by political or religious actors (Mietzner, 2020). The conflict thus becomes a potential catalyst for internal tension rather than a direct security threat.

Ideologically, extremist networks have historically incorporated the Israel-Palestine issue into their propaganda narratives to frame global politics as a struggle between religious communities. Research on radicalisation indicates that symbolic grievances associated with foreign conflicts can be repurposed to justify local violence, even in the absence of direct organisational links (Horgan, 2009). These dynamic underscores the relevance of counter-radicalisation and strategic communication in Indonesia’s security policy.

Economically, the conflict may affect Indonesia through its impact on Middle Eastern stability and global energy markets. Escalations in the region are associated with heightened geopolitical risk and volatility in oil prices, which can transmit inflationary pressures into import-dependent economies such as Indonesia (Caldara & Iacoviello, 2022). This economic exposure illustrates how distant conflicts can generate domestic vulnerability through global interdependence.

In sum, the Israel-Palestine conflict represents a persistent international dispute with profound humanitarian and political consequences. For Indonesia, its significance lies not in military threat but in its diplomatic, societal, ideological, and economic repercussions. These multidimensional effects demonstrate that contemporary national security must account for how geographically distant conflicts reshape domestic risk environments, reinforcing the need for integrated strategies that link foreign policy, social cohesion, and economic resilience.

Table 1. IFAS (Internal Factor Analysis Summary) and EFAS (External Factor Analysis Summary) Analysis

STRENGTH	OPPORTUNITIES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong Diplomatic Credibility and Moral Legitimacy. Indonesia possesses strong moral authority in supporting Palestinian self-determination based on its constitutional mandate to oppose colonialism and uphold international law. This enhances its diplomatic credibility in multilateral forums such as the United Nations and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). • Comprehensive National Security Doctrine (Total Defence Concept). Indonesia applies a holistic national defence and security approach integrating military, economic, political, and societal resilience, enabling it to manage indirect security impacts such as ideological spillover and economic instability. • Experience in Counter-Terrorism and Social Stability Management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhancing Regional and Global Diplomatic Leadership • Indonesia can strengthen its role as a mediator and norm entrepreneur in global peace initiatives, reinforcing its leadership within ASEAN and the Global South. • • Strengthening National Resilience through Integrated Security Policy • The conflict provides impetus to integrate economic security, digital resilience, and counter-radicalisation into a unified national security framework.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Indonesia has developed effective counter-terrorism and deradicalisation frameworks, allowing it to mitigate extremist narratives linked to foreign conflicts and maintain internal stability. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Leveraging Multilateral Platforms for Strategic Positioning Indonesia can utilise the UN, OIC, and Non-Aligned Movement to balance moral diplomacy with pragmatic national interests.
WEAKNESS	THREATS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited Strategic Focus on Indirect External Conflict Impacts Indonesia's security strategy remains primarily oriented towards territorial defence and internal threats, with insufficient institutional focus on geopolitical spillover risks from distant conflicts. High Sensitivity to Global Energy and Economic Shocks Indonesia's exposure to global oil price volatility creates economic vulnerability when Middle Eastern conflicts escalate, potentially affecting social stability. Fragmented Strategic Communication Mechanisms Coordination between security institutions, diplomatic actors, and public communication channels remains uneven, limiting the state's ability to manage public sentiment related to the conflict. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ideological Spillover and Radicalisation Risks The conflict can be exploited by extremist groups as a symbolic grievance, increasing risks of radicalisation and social polarisation. Economic Instability from Geopolitical Volatility Escalations may disrupt global energy markets and trade routes, generating inflationary pressures and fiscal strain. Diplomatic Polarisation in Great Power Competition Indonesia risks being drawn into geopolitical rivalries surrounding the conflict, potentially constraining its strategic autonomy.

Source: Data processed by Researchers, 2026




Figure 1. SWOT Analysis Matrix

Source: Data processed by Researcher, 2024

Based on the analysis conducted by researchers, the following aggressive strategies (strength opportunities) were obtained:

1. Diplomatic Leadership through Moral Authority and Multilateral Engagement

Indonesia's diplomatic leadership in managing the implications of the Israel-Palestine conflict can be effectively strengthened by leveraging its moral authority and consistent commitment to Palestinian self-determination within multilateral forums. This moral authority is deeply rooted in Indonesia's constitutional mandate to oppose colonialism and uphold international justice, which has long shaped its foreign policy identity as an independent and active actor in global affairs. Scholars argue that states possessing normative credibility are better positioned to exercise diplomatic influence in conflict-related issues because legitimacy enhances trust and reduces perceptions of hidden strategic motives (Acharya, 2014). Indonesia's long-standing support for Palestine therefore constitutes not merely a symbolic stance but a form of normative capital that can be mobilised strategically in international diplomacy. Through active participation in the United Nations, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and ASEAN-related mechanisms, Indonesia is able to project itself as a bridge between Western-led institutions and the Global South, thereby reinforcing its role as a mediator rather than a partisan actor. Research on middle-power diplomacy suggests that countries such as Indonesia derive influence not from coercive capacity but from coalition-building, agenda-setting, and norm entrepreneurship within multilateral frameworks (Cooper, Higgott, & Nossal, 1993; Jordaan, 2003). In this context, Indonesia's consistent advocacy for a two-state solution and adherence to international law allow it to frame the Israel-Palestine conflict as a matter of legal justice and humanitarian protection rather than ideological confrontation, which is essential for sustaining diplomatic relevance amid polarised global politics.

The promotion of peaceful resolution frameworks through humanitarian diplomacy further amplifies Indonesia's diplomatic leverage. Humanitarian diplomacy emphasises the protection of civilians, access to aid, and conflict de-escalation, enabling states to contribute constructively without direct military involvement (Minear & Smith, 2007). By prioritising humanitarian assistance and ceasefire advocacy, Indonesia can translate its moral position into practical diplomatic initiatives that resonate with both Western donors and Muslim-majority states. Studies on conflict mediation demonstrate that moral framing combined with institutional engagement increases the likelihood of sustained dialogue and reduces the reputational costs associated with neutrality (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006). Indonesia's involvement in humanitarian efforts for Gaza, for example, has reinforced its image as a responsible international actor while simultaneously satisfying domestic expectations for solidarity with Palestinians. This dual function—external credibility and internal legitimacy—illustrates how moral diplomacy can serve national security interests by preventing

domestic polarisation and maintaining social cohesion in response to emotionally charged international conflicts (Mietzner, 2020).

Multilateral engagement also allows Indonesia to preserve strategic autonomy while avoiding entanglement in great power rivalries that often surround the Israel–Palestine issue. The conflict has increasingly become embedded within broader geopolitical competition, particularly between the United States, China, and Russia, which risks transforming humanitarian concerns into instruments of power politics (Mälksoo, 2015). By acting through multilateral institutions, Indonesia reduces the risk of bilateral pressure and reframes its involvement as part of collective international responsibility. This approach aligns with research showing that middle powers utilise multilateralism as a buffer against external coercion and as a platform for amplifying influence disproportionate to material capabilities (Beeson & Bell, 2009). Indonesia’s leadership within the OIC, combined with its credibility in ASEAN and the UN, enables it to synchronise Islamic solidarity with principles of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence, thereby reinforcing its diplomatic flexibility.

Moreover, diplomatic leadership based on moral authority has implications for Indonesia’s national security strategy by transforming external conflict into an opportunity for strengthening international standing and domestic resilience. Strategic communication that frames Indonesia’s policy as grounded in humanitarian values and international law helps counter extremist narratives that portray the conflict in purely civilisational or religious terms. Research on radicalisation underscores that state narratives emphasising legality and peaceful resolution can weaken the appeal of polarising frames used by transnational extremist networks (Horgan, 2009). Thus, Indonesia’s multilateral diplomacy not only contributes to conflict management abroad but also functions as a preventive security measure at home by shaping public discourse in a constructive direction. In this sense, diplomatic leadership operates as a form of soft security that complements military and economic instruments.

Ultimately, Indonesia’s utilisation of moral authority and multilateral engagement represents a strategic synthesis of values and interests. By embedding its pro-Palestinian stance within institutional diplomacy, Indonesia enhances its reputation as a norm-driven middle power capable of constructive leadership in complex international disputes. This strategy strengthens Indonesia’s bargaining position in global forums, safeguards strategic autonomy amid geopolitical polarisation, and contributes indirectly to domestic stability by aligning foreign policy with societal expectations and countering ideological spillovers from distant conflicts. As contemporary security studies increasingly recognise the role of norms, legitimacy, and institutional participation in shaping state behaviour, Indonesia’s diplomatic leadership in the Israel–Palestine issue exemplifies how moral commitment can be operationalised as a strategic asset rather than a mere ethical posture (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Acharya, 2014).

2. Integrated National Security Policy Using the Total Defence Framework

Indonesia's capacity to manage the indirect implications of the Israel–Palestine conflict can be strengthened through an integrated national security policy grounded in the total defence framework, which conceptualises security as a comprehensive system encompassing military preparedness, economic resilience, social cohesion, and diplomatic engagement. Contemporary security studies emphasise that modern threats are increasingly multidimensional, combining geopolitical shocks, ideological spillovers, and economic disruptions, thereby requiring whole-of-government and whole-of-society responses rather than narrowly military solutions (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). The total defence concept aligns with this analytical perspective by recognising that national resilience depends not only on the armed forces but also on the adaptive capacity of state institutions, markets, and civil society. In the context of the Israel–Palestine conflict, this framework enables Indonesia to translate external geopolitical volatility into an impetus for strengthening internal coordination between defence policy, foreign affairs, economic planning, and social governance. Research on comprehensive security demonstrates that policy integration enhances crisis management effectiveness because it reduces institutional fragmentation and ensures that diplomatic, economic, and social instruments operate within a coherent strategic logic (Hough et al., 2015). By embedding diplomatic initiatives within a broader security architecture, Indonesia can ensure that its foreign policy stance is synchronised with domestic stability objectives, preventing external conflicts from generating unanticipated internal vulnerabilities.

Economic preparedness constitutes a central pillar of this integrated strategy. Geopolitical instability in the Middle East frequently produces energy price volatility and trade uncertainty, which can transmit inflationary pressure into import-dependent economies such as Indonesia. Studies on geopolitical risk confirm a statistically significant relationship between conflict escalation and fluctuations in global commodity markets, particularly oil, which subsequently affect national macroeconomic stability (Caldara & Iacoviello, 2022). Under a total defence framework, economic security is not treated as a separate policy domain but as an intrinsic component of national defence, requiring anticipatory fiscal measures, strategic reserves, and diversification of energy sources. Integrating economic planning with national security assessments allows Indonesia to reduce the domestic impact of external conflict by cushioning price shocks and maintaining social welfare expenditure, thereby preventing economic stress from escalating into political dissatisfaction. This integration reflects the logic of resilience-based security governance, which views adaptive economic capacity as a form of deterrence against non-military threats (Brunner & Giroux, 2009).

Social resilience represents another crucial dimension of the total defence approach. The Israel–Palestine conflict carries strong symbolic resonance in Indonesia, shaping public opinion and identity politics. Research on political communication indicates that distant conflicts can be internalised within domestic narratives, potentially intensifying social polarisation if state communication fails to provide balanced and inclusive framing (Mietzner, 2020). An integrated national security policy allows Indonesia to connect foreign policy messaging with domestic social management strategies, ensuring that expressions of solidarity do not transform into exclusionary or confrontational discourses. The total defence framework supports this objective by positioning civil society and education as security actors, responsible for sustaining cohesion and preventing ideological exploitation. Empirical studies on radicalisation show that grievance narratives linked to foreign conflicts can be repurposed locally when institutional trust is weak and socio-economic anxiety is high (Horgan, 2009). Consequently, integrating deradicalisation programmes, digital literacy, and strategic communication within national security planning transforms social policy into a preventive security mechanism, complementing traditional law enforcement.

Diplomatic integration further enhances the strategic coherence of this approach. Middle power diplomacy literature highlights that states such as Indonesia derive influence not from coercive capabilities but from agenda-setting and coalition-building within multilateral institutions (Jordaan, 2003). By situating its diplomatic advocacy for Palestine within a total defence framework, Indonesia ensures that international engagement contributes to domestic security objectives, such as protecting social harmony and economic stability. Multilateral diplomacy thus becomes not only an ethical or reputational activity but a functional component of national security governance. This synthesis reflects the broader theoretical shift from state-centric defence towards human and societal security, in which the stability of institutions and communities is regarded as strategically decisive (Acharya, 2014).

Moreover, the total defence framework enables strategic foresight by institutionalising risk anticipation across sectors. Strategic foresight literature emphasises that early identification of geopolitical spillovers improves policy adaptability and reduces crisis-driven decision-making (Boin et al., 2017). Integrating geopolitical risk analysis into economic planning and social policy allows Indonesia to prepare for conflict-induced volatility rather than merely react to it. This proactive posture transforms uncertainty into an opportunity for institutional learning and policy refinement, reinforcing state capacity and public confidence. By aligning military preparedness with economic buffers and social cohesion strategies, Indonesia constructs a layered security system capable of absorbing shocks originating from distant conflicts.

Ultimately, the integration of diplomatic, economic, and social resilience within a total defence framework represents a strategic evolution of Indonesia's national security policy in an era of interconnected threats. It operationalises the insight that contemporary security challenges emerge from the interaction of global politics and domestic vulnerabilities, requiring holistic governance rather than sectoral responses. In managing the implications of the Israel–Palestine conflict, such integration allows Indonesia to convert external geopolitical turbulence into a catalyst for strengthening internal cohesion, economic preparedness, and strategic foresight. This approach illustrates how total defence can function not merely as a defensive doctrine but as an adaptive security strategy that aligns values, interests, and institutional capacities within a single national framework (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Hough et al., 2015).

3. Exporting Counter-Radicalisation and Social Stability Expertise

Indonesia's experience in counter-terrorism and deradicalisation provides a strategic foundation for exporting expertise as part of its national security strategy in managing the ideological spillover effects of the Israel–Palestine conflict, particularly in an era where distant conflicts are rapidly transmitted through digital narratives and transnational networks. Contemporary studies on radicalisation emphasise that violent extremism is rarely driven solely by local grievances but is often reinforced by symbolic identification with global conflicts framed in moral or religious terms (Schmid, 2013). The Israel–Palestine conflict occupies a central position in global ideological discourse and is frequently utilised by extremist groups as a narrative of injustice to legitimise violence, even in regions geographically removed from the Middle East (Neumann, 2013). Indonesia's counter-radicalisation model, which integrates law enforcement, community engagement, religious dialogue, and socio-economic reintegration, represents an empirically grounded approach to addressing this narrative dimension of extremism rather than relying exclusively on coercive measures. Research on disengagement from terrorism demonstrates that ideological deconstruction combined with social reintegration significantly reduces recidivism compared to purely punitive strategies (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). By institutionalising this approach through international cooperation and regional security partnerships, Indonesia can position itself as a normative leader in counter-radicalisation while simultaneously strengthening domestic resilience against extremist narratives linked to the Israel–Palestine conflict.

The export of counter-radicalisation expertise functions not only as a technical security policy but also as a form of strategic soft power. Soft power is generated when states shape international norms and practices through example rather than coercion, particularly in sensitive areas such as counter-extremism where legitimacy and trust are crucial (Nye, 2004). Empirical studies show that counter-terrorism strategies perceived as legitimate and culturally adaptive are more likely to be accepted and emulated by other states than those relying on heavy militarisation (Bjørgero & Horgan, 2009). Indonesia's approach, which incorporates moderate religious authorities, former militants, and civil society organisations into deradicalisation programmes, aligns with research indicating that community-based interventions are more effective in preventing ideological entrenchment than purely state-centric repression (Aly, Taylor, & Karnovsky, 2014). Through training initiatives, joint programmes, and knowledge-sharing mechanisms within ASEAN, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and UN-affiliated counter-terrorism platforms, Indonesia can diffuse these practices regionally and globally, thereby enhancing its international standing as a security contributor rather than merely a security consumer.

At the domestic level, exporting counter-radicalisation expertise reinforces Indonesia's own ideological resilience by institutionalising best practices and encouraging continuous innovation. Studies on policy diffusion indicate that states engaged in international knowledge exchange are more likely to update and refine domestic policies in response to evolving threats (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). The Israel-Palestine conflict generates recurring waves of emotive digital content that can intensify polarisation and reinforce binary worldviews, particularly among youth populations exposed to algorithm-driven social media environments (Conway, Scrivens, & Macnair, 2019). By framing counter-radicalisation as both a domestic and international mission, Indonesia embeds its internal security agenda within a broader normative project, making it harder for extremist actors to portray state policies as isolated or illegitimate. Research on narrative contestation shows that extremist propaganda is most effective when it monopolises moral interpretation, whereas state narratives grounded in legality, humanitarian concern, and peaceful resolution can disrupt this monopoly and reduce mobilisation potential (Ingram, 2016). Indonesia's consistent diplomatic support for Palestinian rights combined with its rejection of violence allows it to articulate a morally coherent counter-narrative that distinguishes solidarity from extremism, thereby weakening the discursive linkage between the conflict and domestic radicalisation.

Furthermore, international cooperation in counter-radicalisation enhances strategic trust and intelligence-sharing, which are essential for managing transnational ideological threats. Terrorist and extremist movements increasingly operate through decentralised networks and online ecosystems rather than hierarchical command structures, making early detection and prevention dependent on cross-border information flows (Kenney, 2015). Regional partnerships grounded in Indonesia's practical experience allow for the harmonisation of early-warning indicators, online monitoring practices, and rehabilitation standards, creating a collective shield against ideological contagion from foreign conflicts. Studies of regional counter-terrorism cooperation in Southeast Asia indicate that trust-based networks and shared training significantly improve operational effectiveness and reduce policy fragmentation (Jones, 2012). By acting as a hub for counter-radicalisation expertise, Indonesia transforms its national security experience into a regional public good, thereby reinforcing stability beyond its borders while indirectly protecting itself from spillover effects.

The Israel-Palestine conflict also poses a challenge in the domain of political identity, as it intersects with religious symbolism and perceptions of global injustice. Research on identity-based radicalisation suggests that individuals who perceive themselves as part of a transnational moral community are more susceptible to mobilisation when distant conflicts are framed as attacks on that identity (Wiktorowicz, 2005). Indonesia's strategy of exporting counter-radicalisation expertise allows it to demonstrate that commitment to Palestinian self-determination can coexist with rejection of violence and extremism, thereby offering an alternative identity model grounded in peaceful activism and legal advocacy. This approach aligns with findings that constructive political participation channels reduce the appeal of violent pathways by providing legitimate outlets for grievance expression (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). Through international forums and training programmes, Indonesia can disseminate this model, contributing to a global norm that decouples moral solidarity from violent mobilisation.

From a national security perspective, the export of counter-radicalisation expertise converts a potential threat into a strategic opportunity by linking domestic stability to international leadership. Theoretical frameworks of comprehensive security emphasise that resilience against ideological threats depends on the interaction between internal social cohesion and external normative alignment (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). By embedding its deradicalisation practices within international cooperation, Indonesia reinforces both dimensions: domestically, it strengthens institutional capacity and social trust; internationally, it projects an image of responsible leadership in managing complex ideological risks. This dual effect is particularly relevant in managing the implications of the Israel-Palestine conflict, which continues to generate emotive narratives with high mobilisation potential. Rather

than treating these narratives solely as a domestic policing issue, Indonesia's strategy recognises them as part of a global discursive environment that requires coordinated response.

In sum, exporting counter-radicalisation and social stability expertise enables Indonesia to transform its accumulated security experience into diplomatic capital while enhancing its capacity to neutralise ideological spillover from the Israel-Palestine conflict. By promoting community-based deradicalisation, narrative contestation, and reintegration programmes through international cooperation, Indonesia strengthens its soft power and reinforces domestic resilience simultaneously. Empirical research consistently demonstrates that extremism is best countered not only through force but through legitimacy, inclusion, and credible alternative narratives (Schmid, 2013; Ingram, 2016; Aly et al., 2014). Indonesia's strategy thus exemplifies how national security in the contemporary era can be advanced by exporting norms and practices that stabilise both domestic society and the wider regional environment, converting vulnerability into influence and moral commitment into strategic advantage.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study demonstrates that although geographically distant, the Israel-Palestine conflict generates multidimensional implications for Indonesia's national security through economic vulnerability, ideological spillover, diplomatic positioning, and social stability. These indirect effects require Indonesia to adopt a comprehensive national security strategy that integrates diplomatic leadership, total defence principles, and counter-radicalisation capacity within a coherent policy framework. The findings indicate that Indonesia's moral authority and multilateral engagement can be transformed into strategic assets, while its experience in deradicalisation and social cohesion strengthens resilience against transnational ideological threats. It is therefore recommended that Indonesia institutionalise inter-agency coordination mechanisms, enhance economic shock preparedness related to energy volatility, strengthen strategic communication to prevent social polarisation, and expand defence diplomacy initiatives in multilateral forums to ensure that external conflicts do not undermine domestic stability.

ADVANCED RESEARCH

Future research should move beyond qualitative geopolitical analysis by employing quantitative modelling to measure the correlation between Middle Eastern conflict escalation and Indonesian macroeconomic stability, social unrest indicators, and extremist narrative circulation in digital spaces. Comparative studies between Indonesia and other Muslim-majority middle powers, such as Turkey and Malaysia, would further enrich understanding of how normative foreign policy positions interact with domestic security imperatives. Additionally, policy-oriented research is needed to assess the effectiveness of Indonesia's deradicalisation programmes in addressing foreign-conflict

narratives, particularly through big data analysis of online discourse and experimental evaluation of strategic communication campaigns.

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